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ABSTRACT

Criminal-hacker nexus leads to a 2 step target selection process, which begins with a short list of firms with similar
information assets from which the hacker finally picks up that firm which has the weakest defense. This translates into a
scenario where firms with similar information assets engage in a veiled race so as not to appear as the soft target in the focus
group. In this work we propose a duopolistic model and utilize a differential game framework to analyze the IT security
investment decisions of two firms who find themselves in such a short list of hacking targets and must compete dynamically
on their IT security investments to reduce the risk of being breached. We provide the steady state (singular region) analysis of
the differential game for two firms with symmetric and asymmetric parameters. Our model exhibits that hacker learning and
firms’ security investment efficiency have opposite effects on the two equilibrium outcomes of interest, namely, the security
level and the security investment rate. As hacker learning improves (security investment efficiency increases), the security
levels and security investment rate of the two firms move apart (closer).
Keywords

IT Security, IT Security Investment, Control Theoretic Approach, Optimal Control in IT Security
1. INTRODUCTION

Profitable association with criminals has quite transformed hacker motivation to attack unauthorized computers. Motivations
like gaining swaggering rights, exhibiting technical skills and enjoying playful thrills have given way to purely criminal,
gain-seeking behavior as dictated by the criminals, who now engage hackers for stealing information assets of value. Also,
severe commoditization of Credit and Debit Card numbers, in terms of open availability and high volume of supply in the
black market, have driven prices so low that cyber criminals have now been compelled to revise their game plans. Single
sign-on login credentials for organizations (e.g. Citrix log-in access based on SSO) and FTP accounts now-a-days fetch
premium prices; healthcare related information as well as email exchanges are now traded for high gains 1 . Another popular
hacking target in the face of the current downturn in the global economy is intellectual property; stealing proprietary
marketable information assets is cheaper than creating them through painstaking initiatives in innovation2 .
We pose this interesting question at this point: ‘Given that hackers now work for the criminals, how does this nuance the
security landscape in which a firm must defend its IT assets?’ Unfortunately, there is no straightforward answer to this
question, and there are no obvious insights available from the extant research in IT security. In order to explain such nuanced
IT defense, we argue that the intent and the modus operandi of hacking activities need to be explained from 2 angles: first
from the perspective of the principals of the hacking attacks, namely the criminals, and then from that of their agents, i.e., the
hackers. Consider a criminal intending to steal the Citrix SSO log-in access of a medical practice into a large healthcare
provider network/repository:
(a) The malevolent intent of a criminal in cyber crime stems from his/her downstream contacts and accomplices to utilize the
derived information to buy/sell illegal drugs or set up fake web-based drug stores. (Similarly, a stolen SSO access to the
Outlook express of an equity research analyst is a prized possession to criminals having skills in pump and dump schemes,
because they can now utilize the Outlook access to analyze the exchanges of the official e-mails of that stock analyst.) As a
result, the malevolent intent of the criminals, in view of their strengths in downstream activities, segregates defending firms
into disparate target groups of firms who possess similar information assets. The development of such target groups of firms
is also supported by a large section of the IT security practitioners in the US: about a fifth of those respondents who suffered
one or more kinds of security incidents confirmed that they had suffered a targeted attack aimed exclusively at their
organization, or organizations within a small subset of the general population (CSI survey 2007). In mid-July 2007, The

1
2

Malicious page of The Month, (May 2008). Fijian Malicious Code Research Center,(http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=1367)
Ackerman et. al. (2009). Unsecured Economies, Protecting Vital Information. McAfee Report.
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Washington Post reported attacks on the computers belonging to the U.S. federal government, contractors and companies in
the transportation industry. A report from Message Labs also suggests that narrowly targeted attacks are becoming more
popular (www.DarkReading.com April 18, 2007).
(b) Criminals employ hackers to gain the access to the information asset. For our examples in point-1 above, the skills that
the criminal would look for in a hacker are in terms of penetrating fortified network perimeters and hijacking ports, including
gaining FTP accesses. However, hackers tend to compromise/access the specified information asset by spending the lowest
amount of effort in order to maximize his/her return. This incentivizes a hacker to further select a soft target in the first set of
target victims which was separated by the criminal’s intent (point-1 above). Hackers achieve this intermediate goal by
scoping their potential victims’ defense systems through footprinting, fingerprinting, information enumeration and dry runs.
In view of (1) and (2) above, certain considerations tend to emerge for the defender of a cyber attack. First, a firm needs to
assess its information assets in terms of their unauthorized sale/use, and then ascertain the group of firms from where a
potential hacker could access such similar assets. For example, an inherent security issue for both Facebook and MySpace is
the presence of third-party applications (http://www.eweek.com, Dec17, 2008). Second, having identified the target group
that it belongs to, a firm needs to competitively invest in IT security such that it can offer relatively higher resistance to a
hacker than a comparable firm, in order not to appear as the soft target in the group of similar firms. In other words, a firm
needs to harden its IT security only enough to deter and divert a potential abuser, who would then gravitate to a softer target
that may require relatively less effort to compromise. That relative strength in defense can divert hackers to the less
prepared/secured firm is evidenced in reality. In a sample of 18 financial firms, a 2004 study by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) of UK found that hackers routinely preferred smaller financial firms who also exhibited lower levels of
security investments/preparedness.
Finally, as a result of the above shift in attack dynamics, firms with similar information assets (from the criminal’s
perspective) are now likely to find themselves as competing targets for hackers. In this work, we analyze the investment
strategies of such similar firms in their endeavor not to appear as the soft target of a hence identified target group. In
particular, here we propose a duopolistic model of competing IT security investment between two firms in the same target
group. Our adoption of a stylized duopoly model brings out managerial insights that are important, relevant and timely, but
keeps our analytics tractable. We choose a control theoretic approach for our analysis because of our intention to analyze the
relative investments of the firms on a continuous time profile.
The contribution of this work is two-fold. We provide a model for the nuanced IT security defense in view of the established
fact that hacking activities are quite criminalized today. This helps us analyze the implicit competition among similar firms’
IT security investments facing a scheming hacker. Secondly, we analyze such competition in IT defense within a framework
of differential game, and utilize control theoretic approach in the continuous time. To the best of our knowledge, none of this
has been done before. Significantly, our work brings out the facts that hacker learning and IT investment efficiency play
major roles in the way they determine the level of comparative investment in firms’ IT security investment: we exhibit a
dilution effect on the investment of the firms as investment efficiency increases as well as a spreading out effect on firms’
investment as hacker learning increases because of the experiential gains of the hacker from the scoping and hacking
activities.
In what follows, we briefly review the relevant literature in Section 2, present the notation and the analysis of our model in
Section 3, and provide our concluding remarks in Section 4. This is a research in progress where we plan to analyze a central
planners’ solution and compare the investment levels of the firms between the regimes of parochial and coordinated IT
security investment.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Our current work relates to the interdependence of IT security investment among target firms, and here we provide a brief
review of the closely related literature. Research in the economics of information systems literature address investments in IT
security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) analyze how security vulnerabilities moderate firms’ IT security investments, which
Tanaka et. al. (2005) empirically corroborates. Varian (2002) identifies existence of free riding behavior in firms where he
views IT security in the light of public good being provisioned by private entities. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) analyze this
interdependence of firms’ IT security, and characterize the free riding behavior. Hausken (2006) analyzes IT security
investment as impacted by firms’ interdependence, income, and substitution effects; and later (Hausken (2007)),
substitutability and complementarities of IT security investments. Ogut et al. (2005) differentiate security investments
between technological controls and cyber insurance instruments and show general complementarity between these
instruments. Bohme et. al. (2006) show that correlated cyber risks may create deficiencies in the supply of suitable
cyberinsurance instruments, while Bandyopadhyay et. al. (2009) argue that IT managers face implicit losses leading to
perceived contract overpricing in the demand side of cyberinsurance products. Sharing of Information about IT
security/breaches have also been studied to analyze interdependent IT security investments: Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn
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(2003) show that sharing security information reduce firm’s incentives to invest in IT security, while Gal-Or and Ghose
(2005) argue that IT security investments and information sharing could also feature as strategic complements. The study of
differential games was initiated by Isaacs (1965) with applications to warfare and pursuit-evasion problems. A control
theoretic approach to solve differential games has been utilized in several works (Sethi et. al 2000), Dockner et. al (2000) yet
remained limited to advertising and military games to investigate simultaneous Nash equilibria, and later to investigate
Stackelberg equilibria in Supply Chain scenarios.
3. THE MODEL AND ANALYSIS

The differential game in our model is set up in the backdrop of duopolistic competition between Firms A and B in their bid
not to appear as the preferred target for an attacking hacker. Each of these firms possesses similar information assets which is
the subject of interest to a criminal. In order to compromise the information asset, the criminal engages a hacker, who in turn
attempts to optimize her own efforts during the process of compromising the above information asset. In the following
paragraphs we first present our assumptions and notation, before we present the objective function that the players attempt to
minimize. Next, we present the Hamiltonians, propose the non-singular solutions, and discuss their analytical tractability for
singular solutions. Finally we present the singular solutions of our model first under further assumption of symmetry between
the firms (analytical), and then we relax this specific assumption of symmetry and present a numerical analysis.
3.1 Assumptions and Model

Firstly, we assume that firms A and B are substitutable to each other from the hackers’ point of view, and that the hacker has
the capability to assess the vulnerability level of the firms utilizing standard scoping activities, including those of foot and
finger printing tactics over the Internet. In other words, after scoping activities, the hacker can compare the relative
vulnerability levels of the firms, and channel more hacking attempts toward the softer target. We present below the notation
used in our model and analysis.
xA (xB):

N (t )
LA (LB)
SA(t) (SB(t))

S max

The vulnerability level of firm A (B). This is defined as the probability of breach given
an attack by the hacker. State Variables
The aggregate attacking traffic at time t
Loss suffered firm by firm A (B) from a realized breach
The rate of IT security investment by firm A (B). Control Variables
The maximum rate of IT security investment by either firm A (B)

λ A ( λB )

The current value adjoint (shadow) variable

r

The discount rate, assumed same for either firm A (B)
The investment efficiency parameter of firm A (B)

β A (β B )
ρ

The time rate of increase in vulnerability of a firm as a reflection of the Hackers’
learning effect, assumed same for either firm A (B)
Table 1: Notation Used in Our Analysis

Secondly, we assume that the proportion of hacking attempts targeted at firm A and B at any instant as
(h (t ) = (1 + x A − x B ) / 2 ) and (1 − h (t ) = (1 + x B − x A ) / 2 ) which preserves the aggregate hacking rate and the relative
impact of the vulnerability levels of the firms. A firm’s security level depends on the security investment of that firm,
vulnerability levels xA(t) and xB(t) are functions of SA(t) and SB(t). Consequently, the state equations are 3 :
•

x A = − β A S A (t ) x A + ρ ,

x A (0) = a

(1)

•

(2)
x B = − β B S B (t ) x B + ρ , x B (0) = b
Thirdly, we assume that firm A (B)’s losses due to penetration/breach is an increasing function of the amount of attacking
attempts on the firm A (B). Lastly, the discount rate r captures the current value of summated investments for a firm in our
infinite-horizon model. Firm A’s objective is to minimize the losses from breach through IT security investment, and thus
∞

Firm A solves (Firm B solves the analog problem): Min{∫ ((1 / 2) N (t )(1 + x A − x B ) x A L A + S A (t ))e − rt dt} where x A LA is the
0

3

a and b are the initial vulnerability level of firms A and B respectively.
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expected loss of firm A from one attacking attempt, and N (t )(1 + x B − x A ) / 2 is the amount of attacking traffic at firm A.
Firms A and B’s objective functions can be rewritten as
∞

Max{∫ ( −(1 / 2)N (t )(1 + x A − x B ) x A L A − S A (t ))e − rt dt}

(3)

Max{∫ (−(1 / 2)N (t )(1 + x B − x A ) x B L B − S B (t ))e − rt dt}

(4)

0
∞

0

3.2 General Analysis

Firstly, the current-value Hamiltonians for these firms, based on the state equations (1) and (2), and the objective functions
(3) and (4), can be written as
(5)
H A = −(1 / 2)(1 + x A − x B ) x A L A + λ A ρ − (1 + β A λ A x A ) S A

H B = −(1 / 2)(1 + x B − x A ) x B L B + λ B ρ − (1 + β B λ B x B ) S B

(6)

Where λ A and λ B are the current-value adjoint variables for firms A and B respectively.
From (5) and (6), the Hamiltonians are linear in the control variables (SA and SB), and we have the following bang-bang 4 and
singular solution form for SA and SB.

− (1 + β A λ A x A ) < 0
SA: To be Determined if − (1 + β A λ A x A ) = 0
if − (1 + β A λ A x A ) > 0
Smax
0

− (1 + β B λ B x B ) < 0
SB: To be Determined if − (1 + β B λ B x B ) = 0
if − (1 + β B λ B x B ) > 0
Smax
0

if

if

The controls in the singular region are required to satisfy the following conditions (7).

( H i ) S i = 0,

•

( H i ) S i = d ( H i ) S i / dt = 0 ,

and

As for the current-value adjoint variables

i = A, B

(7)

λ A and λ B , we also have the following equations.

dλ A / dt = rλ A − ∂H A / ∂x A = rλ A − (− x A L A + x B L A / 2 − β A λ A S A )
dλ B / dt = rλ B − ∂H B / ∂x B = rλ B − ( − x B L B + x A L B / 2 − β B λ B S B )

(8)
(9)

Solving equations (7) - (9) and (1) - (2), we have

− r + β A LA x A − β A LA x A xB / 2 − ρ / x A = 0

(10)

− r + β B LB x B − β B LB x A x B / 2 − ρ / x B = 0

(11)

2

2

∧

∧

where x A and x B , the singular levels of firms’ vulnerability, are the solutions of the above two equations. Since (10) and
(11) do not yield closed form solutions, we separately discuss the symmetric and unsymmetrical cases below.
3.3 Symmetric Firms

The symmetric case assumes equality between corresponding parameters of the two firms. When L A = LB = L and
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

β A = β B = β , we have x A = x B = x , which is a solution of βLx2 / 2 = r + ρ / x . From (1) and (2), both x A and x B are
∧

∧

∧

∧

positive constants, thus in the singular period, S A = S B = S = ρ /( β x) , i.e., both firms make identical and constant rate of
∧

security investment in the singular region. In the pre-singular region, for firm A, if (i) a > x A , (i.e., the initial vulnerability
∧

level is higher than that in the singular level), then S A = S max , (ii) if a < x A , then S A = 0 ; and (iii) if

∧

a = x A , then

∧

S A = S A . The pre-singular region solutions for firm B can be derived in a similar fashion. Also, in the symmetric case,
∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

∧

d x/ dL < 0 , d x/ dβ < 0 , d x/ dρ > 0 , d S / dL > 0 , d S / dρ > 0 , and d S / dβ < 0 . Below we summarize the above results.

4

Discreet controls at either Maximum controlling force or Complete absence of any controlling force, no intermediate levels are optimal.
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Proposition 1:
If the two firms are symmetric, then they both make the same constant rate of security investment in the singular
region.
Proposition 2:
The vulnerability level of each firm increases if 1) the Loss from a Breach decreases, 2) the security investment
efficiency decreases, or 3) the hackers’ learning effect increases.
The singular level of security investment rate of each firm increases if 1) the Loss from a Breach increases, 2) the
security investment efficiency decreases, or 3) the hackers’ learning effect increases.
3.4 Asymmetric Firms

In the asymmetric case, we conduct numerical analysis due to the difficulty of obtaining analytical results. The baseline
values of the model parameters as assumed are β A = 1, β B = 2, L A = 100 , LB = 300 , ρ = 0.6 , and r = 0.1 .
3.2.1 Impact of Security Investment Efficiency on Security: In this subsection, we choose the baseline values for all the
parameters except for β. Here we take β A = βB = β , and vary the value of β from 0.1 to 10. Consistent with our results for
the symmetric case, each firm’s vulnerability level goes down as security investment efficiency improves (Figure 1). Firm B,
which has a higher loss of a breach (i.e., LB > L A ), has a lower vulnerability level in the singular region.

Vulnerability Levels

0.5
0.4
0.3

Xa
Xb

0.2
0.1
0

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Security Investments Rate

0.6

0.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Security Investment Efficiency
Figure 1: The Impact of Investment Efficiency (β)
on the Vulnerability Levels of Firms

Sa
Sb

0.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Security Investment Efficiency
Figure 2: The Impact of Investment Efficiency( β)
on the Security Investment Rates of Firms
∧

∧

The difference between the vulnerabilities of the two firms (i.e., x A − x B ) goes down as well, as the security investment
efficiency improves. This indicates that an improvement in the security investment efficiency may dilute the difference of
firms’ vulnerability in the singular region, suggesting a relatively more balanced attacking traffic, since the amount of
attacking traffic is a function of the difference of the two firms’ vulnerability levels. Similarly, the improvement of the
security investment efficiency also dilutes the difference of firms’ security investment rates in the singular region (Figure 2).

0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

Xa (Ma=100)
Xb (Mb=600)

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Hackers' Learning Effect
Figure 3: The Impact of Hackers’ Learning Effect (ρ)
on the Vulnerability Levels of Firms

Security Investment
Rates

Vulnerability Levels
of Firms

3.2.2 Impact of Hackers’ Learning Effect on Security: In this subsection, we choose the baseline values for all the model
parameters except for ρ, which we vary from 0.1 to 1.
5
0.3
4
3
2
1

Sa (Ma=100)
Sb (Ma=600)

0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Hackers' Learning Effect
Figure 4: The Impact of Hackers’ Learning Effect( ρ)
on the Security Investment Rates of Firms
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β i Li , and define Mi to be the Efficiency-Loss parameter for firm i, i = { A, B} . Note that

both firms’ vulnerability levels increase as hacker’s learning effect increases (Figure 3), which is again consistent with our
findings in the symmetric case. Note that the firm with the lower value of Efficiency-Loss parameter is more insecure.
Interestingly, the gap between the vulnerability levels of these two firms increases with Hackers’ leaning. This happens
because the firm with higher value of Efficiency-Loss parameter tends to secure its systems more effectively, and thus is less
sensitive to hackers’ learning effect. This ‘spreading-out’ effect in the gap of firms’ vulnerability levels result in a higher
proportion of attacking traffic target the firm with a lower Efficiency-Loss. We also observe a similar ‘spreading-out’ effect
in Figure 4, where the gap between the security investment rates of these two firms increases as hackers’ learning effect
increases. Also note that, the firm with lower Efficiency-Loss parameter has a higher security investment rate (Figure 4), a
result that reflects that the security investment efficiency chosen for that firm is relatively lower.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS:

We have employed a differential game approach to examine how two firms on a substitutable short list of hacking targets
compete dynamically on IT security investments to reduce the risk of being breached. We have shown analytically how the
firms’ security levels and investment rates change with model parameters in the case where two firms are symmetric. In the
asymmetric case, we have shown that hacker learning and the security investment efficiency have a spreading-out effect and
a diluting effect, respectively, on the security levels and security investment rates of the two firms. The analysis of our model
provides guideline for managers to strategically plan their security investment rates at a particular time and estimate their
security levels effectively in a relative sense that occurs in a dynamic, competitive environment of the modern business.
There are several interesting issues that are worth studying in the future research. For instance, we propose to study the
optimal security investment paths from a central planer’s perspective, compare IT security investments under individual and
coordinated decision regimes and also identify an effective coordination scheme for the two firms when the social solution
offers more beneficial levels of IT security defense for the firms under consideration.
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